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Outline
• Background: NASA Advanced Supercomputing (NAS) 
Division’s high performance computing systems
• Protection: Security approaches for protecting the NAS 
systems
• Detection: Security approaches for detecting possible attacks 
on NAS systems
• Research: Improving methods to extract actionable 
information from the mountain of data that inundates the NAS 
systems
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Background: Computer Systems at the NASA 
Advanced Supercomputing (NAS) Division
• Pleiades: NASA’s most powerful supercomputer 
– No. 15 on TOP500 list of the world’s most powerful 
supercomputers
– 7.25 petaflops (PF) theoretical peak
– 246,048 cores and 938 terabytes (TB) of memory
• Merope: Uses repurposed processors from Pleiades.
– 162 Tflops/s theoretical peak
– 13,824 Cores and 26 TB of memory
• Endeavour: Shared memory system
– 32 teraflops (TF) theoretical peak
– 2 nodes - 1–24 cores with 4 TB and 512 cores with 2 TB memory
• All three systems:
– Manufactured by: SGI with Intel processors
– Run SUSE® Linux
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Background: Use and Data Sensitivity of Data 
on NAS Systems
• NAS systems provide supercomputing resources and user support 
services for science and engineering projects at: 
– NASA Centers
– Universities performing NASA research
– Companies performing NASA research
• NAS system are rated as moderate for data under FIPS 199
– Loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability will have serious adverse 
effect on the organization
• Number of NAS users
– 1798 active accounts
• Includes several hundred accounts for NAS staff and non-supercomputer users 
who are using other systems hosted at NAS
– 440 accounts are for users who are not U.S. citizens
• Includes graduate students and faculty
• Users can
– Access the system over the Internet
– Import and run their own codes
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Protection: Supercomputers Protected Inside
a High End Computing (HEC) Enclave
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Both Local and Remote Users’ Access to HEC 
Enclave Must be Authenticated by SFE
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Security of Access to 
High End Computing Enclave
• Interactive access to the HEC Enclave is through an SFE using 
SSH to encrypt the connection
• File transfers into the HEC Enclave use several mechanisms: 
– SFEs support two-stage file transfers into the HEC Enclave
• From source system to SFE
• From SFE to Processor Front End or Storage
– DMZ secure file server also supports two-stage file transfers
• Requires only password authentication, so can be used for unattended 
file transfers
– Secure Unattended Proxy supports one-Stage File Transfers 
• Also supports unattended file transfers using limited lifetime public-
private keys to authenticate actual transfer
• Files can be transferred to internal HEC filesystem
• File transfers out of the HEC Enclave are not restricted 
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Secure Front End Is An Attack Resistant 
Security Reference Monitor
• Always Invoked Requirement 
– Network Access Control Lists ( ACLs)  ensure that SFEs authenticate interactive 
user’s access to Enclave-resident systems
• Tamper Proof Requirement  
– Design of the SFE minimizes the opportunity to attack the SFE
– SFE implemented as a separate device so that it is isolated from tampering by 
users of other NAS systems
– SFE implemented with a jailed (chrooted) environment for all users,
which:
• Limits user access to system directories
• Permits users to access only those functions required to log in and perform 
file transfers
– Capabilities of the SFE’s Linux operating system 
• Has only those capabilities that are absolutely needed  
• Minimizes the possibility of including unneeded capabilities with potential security 
vulnerabilities 
• Correctly Enforces the Desired Security Policy Requirement
– Authenticates users using two-factor authentication
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Use of SSH Rather than 
VPN For Secure Interactive Access
• Advantages of SSH
– NAS uses SSH for all remote, interactive access to its systems
• Users must first SSH into the SFE
– SSH provides a high level of encryption protection
– SSH is widely available
– SSH can be used from multi-user systems and single-user systems
• Disadvantages of VPN
– It places the remote system on a NASA network with a NASA IP 
address
– The entire remote system must be given this NASA IP address 
when a remote user is using VPN
• Thus, this is not appropriate for users on multi-user systems such as 
might be found at a university 
– Any user’s action on their remote system while connected to a 
NASA VPN actually comes from a NASA IP address, which might 
place NASA in a bad light, if the user does something bad
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Ongoing Actions to Protect NAS Systems
• NAS performs weekly credentialed scans using Nessus during 
which the scanner: 
– Logs onto each of the NAS systems
– Identifies missing patches or existing vulnerabilities that make the 
systems susceptible to attack
– Provides weekly reports to NAS system administrators and NAS 
management
• NAS sinkholes (null routes) foreign scans and all brute-
force attacks, as well as all known malware sites, so that 
the bad actor gets no response
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Detection Provided By NAS Situational 
Awareness System (NSAS)
• Our in-house NAS Situational Awareness System (NSAS) 
identifies security events that require human or automated 
mitigation
• Data sources include:
– Bi-directional network flow data
– Intrusion detection system (IDS) data 
– Log data 
– Nessus vulnerability scanner data 
– Domain Name Server (DNS) requests
– Other external data sources (e.g., list of hostile sites, National 
Vulnerability Database)
• A preprocessor normalizes and enriches data into a common  
information model including geographic and “whois” 
information before sending data to Splunk
• Splunk is used for analysis and display
11NASA Advanced Supercomputing Division
National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA Advanced Supercomputing Division
NAS Research is Underway to Develop 
Enhancements to NSAS
• NASA organizations are inundated with a mountain of network data 
with nuggets of valuable security information buried in the mountain
• Goal of Research: To reduce in near real-time the mountain of data 
that has to be analyzed to discover actionable malicious security 
events
• Approach is to categorize: 
– Entities (IP addresses, ports, organizations, and users) 
– Flows ( stream of network packets) 
– Into the following risk categories, using advanced data analysis tools:
• Acceptable risks are network flows and their associated IP addresses 
associated with authorized, authenticated users
– In general, these can be eliminated from further consideration
• Hostile risks are network flows and associated IP addresses that have been 
identified as associated with a hostile actor
• Unknown risks are network flows and associated IP addresses that will be the 
focus of analysis to move them into either the acceptable or hostile risk 
categories
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Research is Underway to Develop 
Enhancements to NSAS (cont.)
• Want to improve detection of actionable security events, such as:
– Attack flows
– Recurrent flows, which may indicate attempts by implanted advanced 
persistent threat software to contact a command and control center
– Unauthorized exfiltration of NASA data
• Want to develop techniques to visualize associations between 
security events in order to identify unknown patterns of hostile attack
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Questions?
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